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Credit cards and retail credit have been in use for
many years. Most people have at least one, and many possess
a wide range of credit cards. Gasoline credit cards
particularly provide a convenient method of credit all
across the country. They, in fact, provide an interest free
loan for as long as sixty days.
The use of credit cards and the most advanced
electronic computer systems has brought about considerable
speculation on an entirely new method of money and credit
transaction. Some of the names given to this new method
include "checkless," "cashless," and more recently, "electro-
banking." Some people refer to the whole idea as "instant
debt." Many responsible persons, however, do anticipate the
use of "electro-credits" and have even set a time schedule
for this eventuality.
"Checkless" banking may replace our current
system as early as 1980. innovations now being
seriously developed by the banking industry may
eliminate the need for numerous credit cards,
checks-~and, perhaps, cash-~and at the same time
expand and simplify customer services. Made pos-
sible by the use of electronic impulses as the
message, the system would bring large-scale

changes in our everyday business transactions. For
example, one bank ID card would provide identifica-
tion, unlock the customer's bank account, and serve
also as the key to his credit inquiry account at
the local automated credit bureau.
The same time frame is noted in the article, "Cashing
in on the Checkless Society," by Robert L. Kramer and W.
2Putnam Livingston in the Harvard Business Review . Kramer
and Livingston anticipate that the "checkless society,"
which will incorporate the use of electro-credits as a
method of banking and point of purchase transfer of funds
between the customer's account and the retail account, will
be in operation and available to the public by the mid-
1980 1 s. Although the "checkless society" utilizing the full
"on line" nationwide exchange of electro-credits sounds very
exotic, it is still at least fifteen years away.
Many of the features which will be incorporated into
total banking as envisioned for the checkless-cashless soci-
ety exist within the banking industry today. One segment
of our society that would benefit most from a totally
integrated banking program—our active duty military
families--could well be pioneers.
Dale L. Reistad, "The Coming Cashless Society,"
Business Horizons , Vol. 10, No. 3 (Fall 1967), 23-32.
2Robert L. Kramer and W. Putnam Livingston,
"Cashing in on the Checkless Society," Harvard Business
Review, Vol. 45, No. 5 (Sept. -Oct. 1967), 141-149.

Subject Area of Research
Interest in the possible use of "electro-banking"
for military personnel was sparked for the author by the
two articles noted above. He has observed in his years of
military service that there is need among military families
for a more universal banking system, which would be recog-
nized worldwide and provide a "hometown bank" relationship.
He has often observed that military personnel on active
duty have a tendency to carry relatively large sums of
money, sometimes from two or three different countries. In
some instances these persons have lost their lives in air-
plane crashes or have been lost at sea, and the money they
carried is gone forever. If a system were developed
whereby a military person might utilize checks or credit
cards, the loss" of such instruments would not result in the
loss of large sums of money.
A second aspect that will be considered in this
paper is the mobility of military families, most of whom
average a move every other year, requiring the establishment
-
of credit over and over again. It is quite possible that a
military banking program could utilize a universal credit
card recognized everywhere. Several such cards are now
quite acceptable throughout the world, notably the American
Express credit card.

A third aspect which will be considered in this
paper is a line of credit whereby a military person could
"overdraw" his balance in conjunction with his checking
account and credit card and repay this "overdraw" at a
predetermined interest rate.
Research Question
The research question to be considered here is: Is
it now feasible to establish, in conjunction with civilian
banking institutions, a "total banking activity" including
"money cards" for military personnel?
Subsidiary questions are:
(a) Could a military banking program be an aid to
military personnel? How?
(b) What services could be made available?
(c) Could the services of such a program be used
in both the military and civilian community?
(d) Who should organize and be responsible for the
operation of such a program?
Scope
This research paper will examine the banking
facilities and other activities which are now associated
with military pay and the personal finance activities of
military families. Although reference will be made to

military pay in general, which would include all the armed
services, the study will restrict itself to the Navy.
Problems found in the Navy are also found in the other
services. Information used here has been obtained from
the Navy Finance Center in Cleveland and from leading banks
and credit card services. In addition, interviews were
conducted with executives of credit card services, central
charge organizations and banking institutions. Although
very little information is available at the present time in
hard-bound publications, "trade" magazines and banking
newspapers have proven to be highly valuable.
Objective
The objective of this paper will be to present
information relative to the current utilization of the
military allotment of pay, and by researching the various
facilities of financial institutions which are now available
to military personnel, to ascertain if there is a possibility
of combining existent services into a central banking
program whereby the members of the military family may, in
effect, have a "hometown bank" no matter in what part of
the world they are located.

CHAPTER II
CASH AND RELATED PROBLEMS
Military personnel today are paid regularly and
utilize the services available from banks, credit accounts
of department stores, and the many other money transactions
of everyday life. Because the military family is an
extremely mobile unit there are procedures and related
problems which require special attention. These problem
areas include the carrying of large amounts of cash, the
movement of cash from the military man to his family and
the use of checking accounts, the establishment of credit
and obtaining loans, and the use of military pay allotments,
Cash and Check Transactions
The problem of carrying cash has been recognized
for a long time. The American Express Company has used as
a slogan to sell traveler's checks, "Don't carry any more
cash than you can afford to lose." For the same reason the
Navy has for years authorized the Supply Officer on board
ship to accept safe keeping deposit of cash and valuables.
This allows a sailor to draw his pay and deposit the cash

with the Supply Officer to be withdrawn later when needed.
A checking account does provide a degree of safety against
the loss of money through the deposit of a person's pay,
with checks being cashed as necessary. There is, however,
often the problem of finding a facility which will accept a
check. In some localities, banks will not accept checks
drawn on another bank or even another branch of the same
bank. Some banks and their checking accounts enjoy the
reputation of "never bouncing." The Northeastern Pennsyl-
vania National Bank and Trust Company of Scranton,
Pennsylvania, is one such bank. It has as its policy for
military accounts, "Our bank makes an effort not to
embarrass a depositor who incurs an overdraft of a nominal
amount." This bank maintains the checking accounts of
more than 9 , 000- military families all over the world.
Checks drawn on the Northeastern National Bank are recog-
nized in Navy communities as reliable and are readily
acceptable.
In December, 1967, the Navy announced a personal
check cashing service for use on board ship. The reason
given was, "In order to encourage Navy-blue jackets to
develop good financial habits by the use of United States
Letter from S. S. Warman, Vice President,
Northeastern Pennsylvania National Bank and Trust Company,
Scranton, Pennsylvania, November 21, 1967.

banking services." Under the new regulations, for the
first time Navy disbursing officers may cash personal checks
up to $250 for sea duty members whose pay records they hold.
This procedure is meant to provide a useful facility for
personnel serving at sea for extended periods of time.
Through this service a sailor can reduce the amount of cash
carried on board, and release a larger portion of his pay
for deposit by Navy allotment in his bank checking account.
For example, a sailor due $150 on pay day can draw $50 in
cash for pocket money and allot $100 for deposit in a
United States bank through the Navy disbursing system,
knowing that if he needs another $50 before the next pay
day he can cash a personal check. Prior to adoption of the
check-cashing service, many sailors were inclined to draw
their entire pay in cash. This procedure will also be a
benefit to disbursing officers by reducing the number of
safekeeping deposits that they would otherwise have to hold
and account for at personal risk.
Allotments for Family Money
The problem of transferring cash from a shipboard
sailor to his family has been partially solved by the use
Navy Comptroller Review , Department of the Navy,
Washington, D. C, December, 1967, Vol. XIV, No. 4, p. 3.

of allotments. Some sailors prefer to receive all their
pay themselves and then mail or carry it home to their
families. For the military man who does this, an unexpected
ship's movement or delay in the mail causes a hardship on
his family. The use of the allotment insures that the
family will receive money on time each month. If the check
is sent directly to the wife, she is faced with the problem
of safekeeping the entire sum. The use of a checking
account provides both safety and convenience for the paying
of bills by mail or check. As of November, 1967, out of a
total oxf 72 8,261 active duty Navy personnel, 291,205 were
using allotments to provide their families with money
either directly or via allotment to a bank checking account.
These allotments amounted to $50,488,733.22 in that month.
There are a number of problems associated with
allotments. The most frequent one is that of a change of
address to which the allotment is mailed. The delay and/or
time lag in changing address or forwarding an allotment is
a prime source of dissatisfaction at the time of moving on
permanent change of duty. This is especially troublesome
because of the need of additional financial flexibility at
such times. A delay in the receipt of an allotment by a
Letter from Captain J. W. Cartee, SC, USN,




bank when the checking account is being changed can cause
great embarrassment to the military family.
One way to avoid the problem of time lag is to
continue to have the allotment sent to the same bank check-
ing account. This action does not solve the problem unless
the bank is well recognized and its checks are readily
acceptable. If a check is not readily acceptable, there
will be the problem of establishing a source of pocket
money for the military wife whose husband is at sea or on
foreign_ duty . There have been instances in which a military
banking facility has refused to cash personal checks other
than those drawn on its own bank. Such action is usually a
maneuver to harass the military member or his family into
moving their account to that bank. The Navy Exchange
System is authorized to cash only up to $50 per day, which
is not always enough to meet current needs. Also, commis-
sary stores can accept a check for the amount of the
purchase only.
Overdraft
The problems of overdrafts or bounced checks are
especially serious in the military services. In 1966, the
Department of the Navy initiated a policy whereby each Navy
Exchange and Commissary Store would notify the military
member of all returned checks, and at the same time forward
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a copy of the notification to his Commanding Officer and
the Bureau of Naval Personnel for inclusion in his official
record. A returned check, thus, not only causes embarrass-
ment but could also have a detrimental effect on the career
of a military person. This could be true even though a
mistake or an error was committed by the bank.
Credit
Military families often find it difficult to obtain
needed credit at reasonable rates. Many are not aware of
the actual interest rates charged by the "friendly loan
agents" located just outside the main gate of almost every
base or station. The more reputable loan companies and
those with reasonable rates of interest require time to
process loan applications. This waiting time can cause
hardships or "force" a family to seek a loan at the fast
but expensive source. Credit unions and especially the
Navy Federal Credit Union have been of assistance in solving
this problem, but their services are not always accessible.
Morale
Morale is of concern to military commanders. The
military man is equally concerned with the morale of his
family. Pay and family money matters have the greatest
potential to either cause problems or to provide a basis

12
for good morale in the family. The important point is not
necessarily a greater amount of money, but an orderly and
planned flow. Savings and credit are valuable parts of a
well organized family financial program. The military pay
procedure, if used in conjunction with present and proposed
banking programs, can provide greater peace of mind for the
military family, and with it, enhanced morale.

CHAPTER III
PROCEDURES: PRESENT AND FUTURE
To facilitate transfer of funds and credit trans-
actions for military personnel, a number of procedures are
available singly. This chapter will describe various
procedures in use at the present time and those
anticipated, as well as steps that have been taken towards
combining them for greater service.
Allotments
The military services now provide an allotment
procedure whereby specified sums of money from the military
or retired pay are forwarded to designated persons or
organizations monthly. Allotments are used to pay insurance
premiums, make FHA home mortgage payments, and send money
to persons or banks. A single check is used to forward
more than $2.6 million to one institution representing the
aggregate of 26,448 allotments. A second such check to
1Letter from Captain J. W. Carter, SC, USN,





another institution in the amount of $1.3 million represents
4,477 allotment accounts.
The pay of any military person can be allotted at
his request for the purposes authorized. Each type of
allotment carries an identifying letter. These purposes
include: Savings to banks, savings and loan associations
or credit unions (S) , checks to families of enlisted
personnel (Q) , checks to families or to family checking





payment of insurance premiums (I) , and
special insurance premium payments to Navy Mutual Aid (M)
and National Service Life Insurance (N)
.
Table 1 indicates the type and number of allotments
in effect on 1 November 1967. These allotments were made
at the request of 728,261 naval personnel, and amounted to
$74,882,081.67 for that month.
This table points out the fact that many naval
personnel are not at the present time using the allotment
as a method of transferring money. This may be due to lack
of information about allotments or their acceptability by
banks for mortgages and checking accounts, as well as
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*26,141 officers have Navy Mutual Aid Insurance
and 3,301 of these pay an additional premium because they
are aviation personnel.
Source: Navy Finance Center
Bank Credit and Cash Guarantee Card
The use of bank credit card plans, including
"Check Guarantee Cards," may well become an important
segment of a total banking program for the military ser-
vices. These plans are also of concern to those who espouse
the early adaptation of "electro-banking." Details on the
major features of these plans may also be useful in




Credit card programs, as such, have until recently
developed along two lines: first, those operated on a
national level by nonbank organizations primarily for
financing travel and entertainment expenditures (American
Express, Diners Club, Carte Blanche); second, those
operated locally by banks for financing retail sales.
Recently some nonbank organizations have initiated programs
(still largely restricted to travel and entertainment)
intended for banks, while banks (Bank Americard) or groups
of banks (in Illinois, California, Michigan, Connecticut)
have launched or are studying plans for local retail bank
credit cards on a national or regional basis.
In addition to the straight credit card program,
there are other related forms of credit which banks may
operate, alone or simultaneously with a credit card plan.
Revolving check credit, although certainly not new, must be
considered because (1) it achieves a somewhat similar
result without the use of a credit card or the necessity
for including the merchant in the plan, and (2) , perhaps
more important, it is an essential element in other
programs which may have implications parallel to credit
cards. For example, one well known plan (referred to below
as an "overdraft-travelers check" plan) , launched in Boston
in June, 1966, and already accepted by over 130 banks
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throughout the country, is a rather extreme variant or
extension of the check credit theme with some features of
the credit card device. The novelty of the total plan and
its rapid spread would appear to justify the separate
consideration given to it below.
A Federal Reserve Bank survey in 19 6 6 found that at
that time very few New England banks had made a firm decision
about the adoption of a credit card plan. Conversations
with bankers suggest that they are intentionally being
cautious, partly because they are well aware of past
"failures" in bank credit card programs and the admittedly
high start-up costs of such plans, and partly because they
are uncertain as to the kind of program which will best
meet their particular needs.
On the other hand, the survey did indicate that
many bankers feel they will be forced by the pressures of
competition to make a decision in the near future, presumably
in favor of some kind of expanded consumer credit program
similar to those considered here. Hence, they are giving
serious consideration to the possibilities open to them.
In particular, having some knowledge of the problems of an
an independent credit card plan, many are expressing
Letter from Edward V. Hickey, New England
Merchants National Bank, Prudential Center, Boston, Mass
"Evergreen Account," December 19, 1967.

interest in (1) regional interchange programs and (2)
competing ideas, some of which involve the extension of
revolving check credit into an overdraft plan, thus tying
the line of credit directly to the checking account.
Despite the great interest expressed in these
various programs, there is as yet little evidence that
their development will be such as to have a significant
impact, in either a quantitative or qualitative way, on the
payment mechanism in the near future. Nevertheless, if and
when such programs become more common, such as with the
broad base of over three and a half million military
families, they can contribute to a gradually accumulating
amount of knowledge and experience on the part of those
most concerned—bankers, retailers and consumers—with
respect to the procedures and technology most suitable for
a more automatic nationwide credit transfer process.
Credit card and check guarantee card plans may help
especially in problems at the point of retail transactions,
while overdraft loan types of programs may contribute by
relating more closely to bank procedures for an automatic
extension of credit to the account settlements and
customer statements. This would be especially helpful at
time of transfer between duty stations. It is to be
remembered also, that credit cards are simply one of the
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many developments in recent years which have the effect, if
not the intent, of reducing the volume of checks and/or
improving the check settlement mechanism in a variety of
ways
.
Extent of Major Types of Plans
Because of the complexity and cost involved in
establishing a credit card program, the Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston survey included only the larger member banks
in the district since they are located in the areas of
greatest population concentration and trading activity.
Accordingly, member banks with deposits of $50,000,000 and
over, of which there are thirty, were used in the survey.
Results by major category of program are indicated in the
following table.
It should be noted that only six banks have a
regular credit card program and two of the six have been in
operation for several years while four are just becoming
operative. Seven of the ten check credit programs have
been in existence for more than five years. In addition,
plans for the actual implementation of the overdraft-
travelers check program are either incomplete or non-
existent on the part of some of the banks which have paid
for this franchise. Moreover, most banks have adopted a
"wait and see and in the meantime let's study them"
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attitude toward straight bank credit card programs.
TABLE 2




























Does not add to 30 because of duplications, i.e.,
four of the banks have two plans each, in the following
combinations: overdraft-travelers check and credit card;
overdraft- travelers check and check credit; credit card
and check credit; check credit and other.
It is possible
widespread than is indi
survey, but contacts wi
the contrary, several o
such plans under active
our attention has been
than- $50 , 000 , 00 0-deposi
plan, while nine banks
overdraft-travelers che
that credit cards are more
cated by the sample used in this
th bankers do not suggest so. On
f the large banks do not have any
consideration. Moreover, to date
called to only one bank in the less-
t category which has a credit card
in this category have adopted the
ck plan.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank, Boston
"Bank Credit Card and Related Plans," New England
Review, December, 1966, p. 3.
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On the other hand, the inconclusiveness of the
figures in the sample may well disguise and understate the
nature and significance of present and impending develop-
ments in the programs under consideration here. Several
plans, some national and others regional in coverage, are
just now in the stage of being presented to banks for their
consideration. Most bankers, feeling the mounting pressure
of competition and being increasingly aware of the possibi-
lities of automation in relation to credit operations,
feel that it is simply a matter of time before they will
have to enter the credit card field too. However, all banks
will not adopt the same type of program. Each will select
that plan--credit card, check credit, overdraft or some
other variant—which seems to meet its needs best.
Nevertheless, many of these may well have similar effects
on the payments process. Or, it is conceivable that over a
period of time the variety of plans may tend to converge
toward a common system.
For these reasons, the following sections will
describe the essential features of each of the major types
2
of programs, providing a partial basis for consideration
The American Bankers Association publishes
annually the National Automation Conference which presents
papers and projects of its sessions covering the most
recent developments in automated bank.
2
In the absence of detailed case studies of the
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of the relative strengths and weaknesses of each and thus
some indication of the chances of its survival and
potential impact on the payments mechanism.
Essential Features of Major Plans
Bank Credit Cards . --Bank retail credit card programs
are basically a means by which a bank in one process
finances the consumer's purchases and the retailer's
accounts receivable. Since the major features of these
plans, including those in the New England banks, are quite
similar, the following description is a composite of the
plans found in the six banks described in the Federal
2Reserve Bank, Boston, survey.
The consumer becomes a cardholder by meeting the
bank's credit requirements and having a line of credit
results of individual programs, this seems to be the only
basis for evaluation at this time, other than the subjec-
tive comments of participants which will be referred to
below.
Recently developed nonbank- sponsored bank credit
card plans (Diners Club, Carte Blanche) are not included
because they are still more concerned with travel and
entertainment expenditures and with higher income and
credit rating groups than are retail credit cards. How-
ever, the volume generated by these plans as well as their
potential move to the local retail level suggests that
they may become increasingly relevant to the problem at
hand. The recent affiliation of Carte Blanche with the
First National City Bank and American Express with numerous
banks under their "Executive Credit" plan indicates a new
trend.
2Bank Credit Card and Related Plans, op. cit ., pp. 6-25.
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established for him. Usually the card has an expiration
date of six months or one year, at the end of which the bank
can reassess the credit rating of the customer and cancel
the card if necessary. Each bank has an announced credit
ceiling for loans in the program. ($300-$500 was most
frequently mentioned, although it was felt that the ceiling
would gradually be raised if and when experience justified
it.) However, the maximum for each individual cardholder
will vary with his credit rating. In addition, it is
customary to have "floor limits" ($25, $50, and $100 were
most frequently mentioned) on each transaction, which may
be exceeded only after the merchant obtains the bank's
approval. This is a safeguard against the so-called
"runaway" card.
The merchant, usually on a daily basis, deposits
«
the sales slips generated from transactions under the plan
and receives immediate credit for that amount less the
bank's discount. In turn, the bank bills the cardholder
monthly for the total amount charged at the various stores
participating in the plan. The sales. slips which the
merchant deposited with the bank may be included with the
-'-A survey in the Third Federal Reserve District of
19 banks revealed six banks with ceilings of $5,000 and
one that exceeded that limit. "First Phase A-OK, All
Systems Go," Business Review , Federal Reserve Bank of
Philadelphia, November, 1966, p. 11.
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statement. Normally the bank makes a photographic record
of these sales slips and the credit card agreement states
that such records are sufficient to establish the
customer's liability in the event of any action or dispute.
Income to the bank is derived from two sources-
interest or service charges on consumer loans and merchant
discounts and fees. Although the consumer does not pay for
the credit card and is not charged interest for any bill
paid within a grace period (usually twenty-five or thirty
days) , he does pay a service charge of 1 to lh per cent per
month on any unpaid balance. Almost without exception,
the cardholder is required to repay at the monthly rate of
$10 or 1/10 of the amount borrowed, whichever is greater.
The retailer pays (1) an entrance fee upon joining the
plan, (2) an annual rental fee or sometimes an outright
purchase price for the sales slip imprinter (although on
some occasions the bank may provide these without charge)
,
and (3) a discount on the sales slip deposits, which may
vary from 2 to 7 per cent depending on the volume of sales
generated by the merchant.
In addition to the features described thus far,
which are common to all credit card plans, there are a few
To this point card services follow the same
methods, including the sources of income. The Central
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variations of interest mainly because they may illustrate
the attempt by individual banks to surpass their competition
by extending consumer services or simply to deal with
particular customer grievances concerning present services.
For example, some banks advertise that a certain amount of
life insurance goes into effect automatically whenever the
cardholder elects to extend his borrowing beyond the grace
period. Again, it is not uncommon for a "cash advance" or
"instant money" privilege to accompany the credit card.
Under this arrangement, the cardholder may in effect borrow
cash up to a set maximum upon presentation of his card at
any of the bank's branches. The amount borrowed is then
added to the outstanding balance in the customer's account.
(An extended version of this check cashing privilege,
adopted as an independent program by one bank, is described
more fully in the section below on "Other Plans"). It is
sometimes asserted as a peripheral benefit of the credit
card that a cardholder who is a regular checking account
customer may use the card as a virtually uncontestable means
Charge Service of Washington, D. C. , a regional card service
covering parts of Maryland, Virginia, and Delaware with
5,000 merchants enrolled, has one million cardholders.
Interview with Mr. J. J. Lockwood, General Credit Manager
and Mr. Duane J. Novosedliak, Assistant Secretary, November
29, 1967.
Worcester County National Bank, Worcester, Mass.
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of identification for cashing his own personal checks at
any of the bank's branches where he might otherwise be
unknown
.
Check Credit .—Revolving check credit is in effect
a straight consumer loan type of program. In the past it
has been offered by banks as simply another form of con-
sumer installment financing. More recently, however, check
credit appears in some banks to have been relegated to the
position of a comparatively unadvertised supplement to the
newly established credit card program, while for other
banks it is viewed as a relatively uncomplicated and inex-
pensive, although perhaps temporary, means of competing
2
with credit cards. The revolving check credit type of
procedure is relevant to this paper also because the
recently launched overdraft-travelers check plan appears to
«
be an extension of check credit and is in some respects a
direct competitor of bank credit cards with many similar
implications.
Under a check credit plan the consumer obtains from
First National City Bank, New York, New York.
2An exception to this latter point is the First
National Bank of Boston which early in 1966 installed a
check credit plan although it has had a credit card program
in operation for many years. The reason given for the
initiation of the check credit program was that it was
aimed at a different group of borrowers.
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the bank a revolving line of credit just as under a credit
card plan. However, in place of the charge card he is
given a book of checks, specially numbered or otherwise
uniquely identified. Use of the check to make purchases
constitutes a loan by the bank for which the consumer pays
a 1 to 1% per cent service charge per month on the unpaid
balance. In addition, the customer may be required to pay
a fixed amount for each check as in a regular checking
account.
Revolving check credit plans have been in operation
in the Third Federal Reserve District since 1959. The
following table indicates the characteristics of these
plans in nineteen banks as of 1965.
TABLE 3
CHARACTERISTICS OF REVOLVING CHECK CREDIT PLANS
IN THE THIRD FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT— 19 BANKS
Monthly Repayment Terms No. of Banks
1/2 approved line 6
1/2 4 approved line 5
1/25 approved line 1
1/20 amount in use 3
1/21 amount in use - 1
1/24 amount in use 3
(continued on next page)





(Statutory maximums: Pa. - $5,000;

























Interest Rate Per Month
1% outstanding balance--all banks surveyed in N.J. and Del.,
and those in Pa. that include life insurance
.998% outstanding balance—Pa. banks that do not include
life insurance


















52-s - 85 -s
55% - 75%
Del. a a
Only two banks in Delaware offer revolving check
credit plans; specifics are omitted to preclude identifica-
tion. Typical approved line in Delaware tends to be higher
than in other sectors of the District; percentage of line
in use tends to be lower.
Source: Federal Reserve Bank, Philadelphia
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Overdraft-Traveler's Check Plan . —The franchise for
a quite different but related type of program has now been
acquired by over 130 banks. Referred to as "a marriage
between check credit and the regular checking account/'
additional features make a package which its sponsors
regard as superior to credit card plans for competitive
purposes in the foreseeable future.
To participate in this plan one must have a checking
account with the bank, file an application, and establish
eligibility for a line of credit. The depositor then
receives in addition to his regular checks, (1) up to a
$2,500 cash reserve or line of credit behind his checking
account, (2) a supply of special travelers checks, and
(3) an identification card.
The cash reserve is simply a revolving check credit
but it entitles the depositor to overdraw his regular
checking account, to the extent of his line of credit, by
the use of either his regular checks or the special travel-
ers checks. Thus, whenever the depositor writes a check
for an amount in excess of the balance in his regular
account, additional funds (in units of $100) are auto-
matically credited to his account.
"Security First National Bank of L.A. will 'Go
National 1 Through License with Other Banks," American
Banker, May 25, 1966.
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The special checks are direct obligations of the
bank and designed to be used like any other types of
travelers check. Each check may be written for any
specific amount, up to a maximum of $25, $50 or $100 as
designated on the check itself, and that amount is deducted
from the depositor's balance. In order to use these
checks the depositor must show his identification card—
a
protection against the use of lost or stolen checks. An
added benefit from the identification card, it is asserted,
is that it entitles the owner to cash personal checks
without delay at any office of the bank. This feature is
not without merit, perhaps, to the depositor who has
experienced difficulty in establishing his identity for
check cashing purposes at a branch office.
A final element in the plan is a common one in loan
programs— the protection of credit life insurance for the
depositor to the extent of his use of the cash reserve
feature.
A similar plan is under study by the Navy Federal
Credit Union, which is an advanced loan to go into effect
when the check is used. The total loan may be as large as
$700, the checks are made payable to the borrower in the
amounts of $25, $50, or $100 and require an endorsement at
the time of use. This endorsement commences the loan in
the amount cashed. The rate of interest is .8 per cent per
month of the outstanding balance. The plan is known as
POP, Point of Purchase.
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The costs to the user of the check plan are of
three kinds: (1) fifty cents per month, (2) the normal
checking account charges of the bank, (3) one percent
interest on the loan balance. If the loan is repaid within
a ten-day grace period, there is no interest charge.
Minimum repayment terms are the customary monthly $10 or
1/10 of the loan balance, whichever is greater.
Other Programs .—The two plans described here are
included because they represent interesting competitive
variations on parts of programs outlined above and hence
they may in some respects add to developments in the same
general direction.
(1) Special Overdraft-Loan Account. --This plan,
initiated in June, 196 6, is somewhat comparable to the one
above in that it represents a partial tie between the
bank's revolving check credit program and its regular check-
ing accounts. This service, however, does not include a
travelers check and the special account is actually still
separate from the regular checking account. The depositor
who wishes to participate establishes -a maximum credit line
(the bank's general announced maximum is $4,800). He then
in effect has two accounts, his regular checking account
and a special loan account, and he receives two kinds of




checks, regular and special, differentiated only by color
and a code number. Any use of the special check constitutes
a loan from the so-called "cash reserve" even though the
depositor has a positive balance in his checking account.
However, a regular check may be drawn in an amount exceeding
the checking balance and the bank will automatically transfer
the required amount, in multiples of $50, from the cash
reserve to cover the overdraft. The depositor receives two
monthly statements, one for his checking account and one
for his special loan account whenever the latter is
activated by use of either a special check or an overdraft
on his regular account.
Loan repayment is by a pre-established schedule,
with the monthly payment depending upon the amount borrowed,
although a minimum of $15 per month is required for loans
under $360. The cost to the depositor for this program
consists of one per cent interest charge per month on the
average loan outstanding plus the normal charge per check
for both regular and special checks.
(2) Check Cashing Guarantee Card.—Everyone with a
checking account is given, at no charge, an identification
card. New depositors receive the card only upon
By comparison, the travelers check previously
described is drawn against the regular checking account.
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presentation of satisfactory references or after the lapse
of a period of about 90 days during which the depositor has
established an acceptable deposit record.
Introduced in Boston in the fall of 1965, the plan
in its first phase offered simply an identification and
check cashing guarantee card enabling the holder to cash
checks up to $50 in some 6 local area supermarkets of
leading chains as well as at the bank's many branches.
It is to be noted that this plan has no cash reserve
or loan aspect connected with it. However, according to
the bank it has been successful in helping to attract
depositors
.
Some Points of Comparison
With the exception of the check cashing guarantee
card, which is strictly a deposit service with no cash
reserve or check credit feature attached to it, all of the
programs described above are essentially forms of install-
ment credit. However, there are certain important
differences among them--important here because they lead to
contrasting advantages and/or disadvantages of each plan
from a competitive viewpoint, with possibly different kinds
of impacts on the payments mechanism (although as is





Basically, a bank retail credit card program in-
volves charge account banking, whereby the bank finances
the purchases of the consumer and the accounts receivable
of the merchant through the charge card and revolving credit
devices. Check credit includes a similar revolving line of
credit but eliminates the use of credit cards and does not
involve the financing of account receivable of merchants.
In contrast to credit card and check credit plans, under
the overdraft-travelers check plan the consumer must be a
depositor of the bank. His line of credit or so-called cash
reserve is in the form of an overdraft privilege on his
regular checking account, regardless of whether he uses his
regular checks or the travelers checks to make the trans-
action. The special overdraft-loan account plan described
above also includes the overdraft by either the regular or
special check, "but the use of the special check always
results in a loan regardless of the size of the checking
account balance.
Given the essential similarities and differences in
In response to the BankAmeriCard plan by Bank of
America, Security First National Bank of Los Angeles has
recently introduced an overdraft system in which a customer
using his regular checking account can draw upon a pre-
arranged line of credit, with no special checks or separate
accounts involved. In addition, Security First will issue
to these depositors, at no charge, a Check Guarantee Card
whereby it "guarantees payment on all Security First




the major plans, some of the more important advantages and
disadvantages of each can be summarized in a fairly
clearcut way. However, the quantitative assessment of
them by a bank for competitive purposes may be quite a
different matter.
A credit card plan, from the point of view of the
bank, can be a highly profitable operation. In addition
to the direct income from consumer loans and merchant dis-
counts, it can be used to attract new depositors
,
both
merchant and individual consumer, and these in turn may be
induced to make use of other services of the bank.
Moreover, the major promotional effort required for both
the launching and the continuing success of a credit card
program may result in the creation of a new and expanded
image of the bank.
For the merchant, a credit card plan, if sufficiently
widely accepted and used by the public or the military as a
group, may result in a reduction (but not elimination) of
accounts receivable and customer credit problems, a better
cash position, and an increase in sales. To the consumer
a credit card means immediate credit with participating
retailers and the convenience of a smaller pocket cash
requirement.
On the other side of the picture, a major
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disadvantage of a credit card plan for the bank is its
invariably high startup cost, including promotional programs
aimed at both consumer and merchant, installation of
imprinters, enrollment of cardholders, and acquisition of
computer facilities if not already available. Moreover,
experience has shown that the bank may face a rather
prolonged period (probably several years) of losses on the
plan, during which it will be necessary to sustain its
promotional campaign.
Obviously, to be successful the bank must induce
retailers to participate in the plan and consumers to make
use of the charge card. Hence, any grounds for retailer or
consumer opposition or dissatisfaction also constitute
obstacles for the bank. Merchants may not be receptive
because of the .cost involved: entrance fee, imprinter
rental or purchase, discounts. In addition, the merchant
must establish an account with the bank if he is not
already a depositor, sign a contract, and submit to all the
usual details of a bank credit card transaction— including
Comments from bankers in this survey as well as
from other sources suggest that although computer
facilities have not been absolutely essential to a suc-
cessful credit card operation in the past, they will
probably become increasingly so in the future as competi-
tion becomes more severe. At present, the Central Charge
Service, Washington, D. C. with 5,000 merchants enrolled




the use of the charge slip, imprinter, daily deposit of
sales slips, referral to the bank on sales in excess of
the "floor limit," and lists of lost and stolen cards.
Moreover, it should be remembered, the merchant will still
have to conduct his own credit operation since not all of
his customers will be credit cardholders. At the same
time, experience to date shows that large chain and
department stores do not as yet participate in bank credit
card plans, the result being that the bank must attract a
large number of small and medium size merchants if it is to
achieve the volume necessary for profitable operation.
With respect to the consumer, the bank is faced
with obtaining his acceptance of the charge plan--even
though many merchants may not participate in the plan and
the consumer may still prefer to use cash or pay his bills
by separate checks. It is not difficult to put the charge
card in the hands of a large number of people. The problem
is in making sure that the cardholders are creditworthy and
that enough of them make sufficiently active use of the
cards to create an adequate volume of -total billings under
the plan. At this point the bank is confronted with a
dilemma and what many bankers believe to be the source of
the real danger in a credit card program. In order to
persuade merchants to join the program the bank must give
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evidence of having at least a potentially large number of
cardholders , but indiscriminate issuance of cards on the
basis of too lenient credit standards may mean high credit
losses. It is to be remembered that in accepting the mer-
chant's daily sales slips for deposit the bank acquires
these receivables without recourse, except in instances
when the merchant has given credit in excess of the "floor
limit" without prior approval by the bank.
As already indicated, revolving check credit is a
much simpler and less expensive type of program and in some
respects may be regarded as either a partial alternative
or a supplement to a credit card plan. Since the bank
finances only the consumer, there is no merchant solicita-
tion of any kind under check credit. In turn, the consumer
is not restricted in his purchases to participating
merchants, although credit card plans may to some extent
offset this by offering an "instant cash" feature.
• With check credit the bank can ordinarily be more
selective in its credit exposure and retain closer control
over it than under a credit card program where there is
necessarily pressure to achieve a relatively widespread
distribution of charge cards. Also, since check credit
transactions are normally for larger amounts than credit
card purchases, the bank may be able to achieve
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profitability on a smaller volume of transactions through
the check credit method.
On the other hand, a check credit program does not
by itself create as many avenues for increasing the bank's
total business as does a credit card plan. For example, a
merchant who wishes to participate in the single bank
credit card plan becomes a depositor of the bank if he is
not already one. In addition, banks launching charge card
programs indicate their belief that the additional ser-
vices rendered the consumers, over and beyond the mere loan
aspect in the check credit plan, will entice many card-
holders to become customers of the bank's other departments,
If true, this is an important result for the banks because
most indicate that the majority of borrowers under ordinary
check credit programs are not depositors of the lending
bank. The attraction of new deposits is thought to be
especially important by some banks now in a period of tight
money because with the launching of the kinds of programs
discussed here the banks may give the appearance of easily
expanding consumer credit when they are rationing credit to
business
.
The extent to which check credit is viewed as a
partial alternative or competitor for a credit card plan is
a temporary one at best. Competitive pressures are
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presently in the direction of the extension of bank con-
sumer financing services well beyond the scope of simple
revolving check credit. Newly created programs with the
overdraft feature— such as those described above—may be
important here not only because they compete with credit
cards but also because they all have the common element of
tying the revolving line of credit directly to a regular
checking account. Experience gained in programs involving
this type of relationship may be beneficial in any future
development of a direct "on-line," "electro-banking" con-
nection between credit card charge transactions and
consumer checking accounts. Hence, it is suggested that
this aspect, as well as the immediate competitive importance
of a plan such as the overdraft-travelers check idea, be
kept in mind in any consideration of its strengths and
weaknesses.
To the military family this latter plan offers the
convenience and security of an overdraft or cash reserve
behind his regular checking account, which costs nothing
unless used--except for the annual membership fee now
ranging from $5 to $8 depending on the issuing bank. In
In particular, it could contribute to the
development of what Governor George Mitchell refers to as
"a credit system which ties settlement accounting into
quasi-automatic credit extension." American Economic
Review, May, 1966, p. 164.
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the special travelers check the user finds some features
superior to both ordinary travelers checks and conventional
credit cards—or so it is asserted. 1 A direct obligation
of the bank, it is supposedly acceptable everywhere that
any travelers check would be and is not limited to retail
establishments belonging to a particular credit card plan.
Again, in contrast to conventional travelers checks, these
are not paid for in advance but only when used-— and then
through the same procedure and at the same rate as regular
checks. Finally, as compared to the inherent dangers from
lost or stolen credit cards, the special travelers check is
personalized and its use is possible only with the
accompanying identification card.
To retailers the overdraft-travelers check concept
has an obvious immediate appeal: they pay nothing to
handle the special checks, and hence they "save" the 2 to
7 percent discount paid to the bank under a credit card
plan. In addition, the travelers check is handled as any
ordinary check, and the merchant need not concern himself
with charge slips, imprinters, "floor -limits, " lost or
stolen card lists and the other details of a credit card
plan. On the other hand, neither is the merchant relieved
of financing his receivables unless the travelers checks
-^-First/Group, Inc., Boston, Mass.
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are a complete substitute for credit cards— a point which
its originators have not asserted.
From the bank's point of view a major advantage of
this plan is that it avoids the admittedly heavy startup
costs associated with a credit card operation. To join the
program a bank pays a franchise fee of $10 for each $1
million of its deposits. The sponsoring organization
contracts to spend part of the franchise fees in promoting
the program among merchants as well as prospective card-
holders. Nevertheless, this does not mean that a
participating bank need incur no promotional or solicitation
expenditures. If the plan is to be financially worthwhile,
retailers must be familiar with and willing to accept the
travelers checks.
Even more important, if this plan is actually to
compete with credit cards, the consumer must be willing to
use the travelers checks as frequently as he would a credit
card, and on this there are several reasons for skepticism.
Membership in the plan now costs the consumer from $5 to $8
per year, whereas there is usually no -charge for a bank
credit card. The checks themselves are less convenient, as
compared to credit cards, in that they must be written out
•^This is to be compared with the BankAmericard
franchise fee of an initial $25,000 plus an "override"
ranging from zero to one-half percent of volume.
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for each transaction and are available only in relatively
small numbers at a time (books of $500, with checks of $25,
$50, and $100 denominations). It is to be emphasized also
that, unlike credit card and check credit plans, the cus-
tomer here cannot borrow until he has exhausted the
balance in his checking account. Finally, there is the
crucial question of the acceptance of the travelers check
where the user is not known. Experience to date, with
respect to the long-established travelers checks, does not
indicate an easy or quick answer to this problem.
In spite of these possible drawbacks this program
(or something comparable to it) may well be an attractive
alternative to a credit card plan for many banks in view
of the lower immediate cost and the revenues derived from
interest on loans, membership fees and check processing
charges. Also, according to its proponents, a potentially
significant collateral benefit of the plan is the effect
it might have in obtaining new depositors, attracted by
the convenience and security aspects of the plan, either
as a substitute for or perhaps even an addition to the
consumer's present use of credit cards and/or check credit.
Implications: Some Observations
If the present interest in bank credit cards (and
other kinds of plans discussed above) were to develop into
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a total banking program with nationwide recognition,
acceptance and interchange of card credit— it seems probable
that, other things being equal, check flow would be less
than might be anticipated under the present system. But,
how much less, how soon and what further contributions
such a "movement" might make to the evolution of the pay-
ments mechanism will depend on the nature and the extent
and rapidity of spread of the various kinds of plans.
Thomas W. Gormley, senior vice president of the
Pittsburgh National Bank, has stated: "Not the least of
the reasons Pittsburgh National, and many other banks, are
in the charge card business is the conviction that this
service is a giant step toward the financial utility
. . .
toward the day when we have a checkless, cashless society.
. .
." Similarly, president James F. English, Jr. of
Connecticut Bank and Trust Company, says, "We are moving to
a checkless society and we believe this [credit card plan]
2
is the first step in it." Closer to the thinking of many
"We're in the Charge Card Business—Should You
Be?" Based on presentations at the Regional Meetings of
the Bank Public Relations and Marketing Association in
Columbus, Ohio, April 5, and in Montreal, Canada, April
22, 1966, by C. T. Russell and D. Doughterty, Pittsburgh
National Bank.
o
R. A. Bennett, "New President of Conn. B. & T.
Exemplifies Growing Breed of 'Scientific' Bankers,"
American Banker, August 8, 1966, pp. 1-2.
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bankers is the position of Security Frist National Bank of
Los Angeles. After some rather extensive research on the
marketability of the Bank of Delaware Touch-Tone phone
system experiment, Security First concluded that the
volume potential would not justify the large investment
required.
Still the research served the purpose of
uncovering interest on the part of both retailers
and consumers in having checks more widely accepted.
"At this point, we swung completely around in
our thinking," says Mr. Stockbridge (senior vice
president of Security First) . Whereas the bank had
started out to jump directly into the "checkless
society," it decided that such a step was prema-
ture, that a series of intermediate steps was
needed— steps that took the bank, customers and
retailers in that direction but without the high
costs of a computer-terminal system.
"We decided to make the checking account the
central instrument," Mr. Stockbridge says. "We
were working toward expanding and improving our
present banking services, not getting into an
entirely new business . "1
As already mentioned, Security First finally
adopted a program which combined a Check Guarantee Card
with an overdraft privilege rather than a credit card plan.
In view of the presence of BankAmericard in California this
choice is not difficult to understand; However, Security
First had also given some thought to the possibility of a
J. R. Hambleton, "Security First Takes 'Calcu-
lated Risk 1 with New Check Guarantee Card," American
Banker, July 22, 1966, p. 2.

46
pooled program with a group of California banks but
rejected the idea on the ground that "credit cards lose
much of their advantage as a competitive tool when all
banks are offering basically the same service."
Despite references to the checkless society,
clearly their most remote purpose in launching credit card
programs is not, as such, to promote the checkless society
but to be in the vanguard of any moves in that direction so
they will not be at a competitive disadvantage if and when
it arrives. More immediately, the interest in credit cards
and related ideas is quite directly a result of current
competitive pressures.
There is the increasing competition among commercial
banks themselves and between commercial banks and other
institutions for the deposits of individuals and businesses.
Also, bank customers have been demanding new services.
These developments have, perhaps, been especially note-
worthy in the rapidly growing field of personal and
installment credit. Hence, it is not surprising that
bankers have referred to their credit .card or related
consumer credit plan as "a marketing program aimed at
attracting depositors" and as "first and foremost a matter
lj. R. Hambleton, "Bancardcheck Seeks to Provide
Variation on Credit Card Theme," American Banker , July
26, 1966, p. 2.
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of meeting and staying ahead of our competition." It is to
be noted here again that not all banks consider a credit
card plan as necessarily the best merchandizing device in
the present situation; some conclude that some type of
competing program may be as effective; and, as will be
explained later, such competing programs if developed to a
similar degree could have implications for the payments
mechanism perhaps of equal significance to credit cards.
Also in the realm of competition is the relevance
of advancing computer technology. As more banks make use
of the computer and as they graduate to more advanced
systems, they are under pressure to justify the expenditure
by making more complete use of this equipment. One such
use is for a credit card or similar program. In turn, it
is recognized that a computerized operation improves the
speed and efficiency of the service to merchants and card-
holders and, perhaps equally important, gives tighter
control over misuse of cards— the "runaway" card problem.
In addition, the computer can be used to provide participa-
ting merchants with various types of reports in the area of
marketing analysis and sales data—information which
retailers may otherwise feel that they will lack if they
relinquish their own credit operations too completely.
R. C. Kolb, "Computer Vital Tool for Credit Card
Operation," American Banker , June 6, 1966, p. 16.
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Again, as a competitive device, bank credit card
programs if properly managed can be highly profitable.
This has been proven by banks with programs started in the
early 1950' s as well as by those of more recent origin. It
should be assumed here, perhaps, that "properly managed"
includes not only persevering through the early period of
losses and directing the program wisely but also using
foresight and judgment in arriving at the initial decision
that a credit card program is feasible in the given market
1
area.
On this latter point, it may be of interest to
examine some of the reasons advanced by banks which have
rejected or are not now seriously studying the possibility
of adopting programs of the type being considered here.
With respect to straight single bank credit card plans,
banks in Maine and Vermont indicated their belief that the
population in their areas would not support the expenditure
involved, that the people were too conservative and were
not ready for local credit cards, that for the present at
least the American Express type of card fulfilled the need.
Here as well as elsewhere frequent reference was made to
Chase Manhattan's experience— "If Chase couldn't make a
^Barry Pickell and Roger Abouchar, "Look Before
You Leap into Credit Card Field," American Banker , June
6, 1966, p. 16
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go of it, who are we to try?" Again, the experience of
several banks with revolving check credit was less than
satisfactory, and this was cited as a reason for lack of
enthusiasm about credit cards. In some cases, the
relatively smaller banks in the urban centers felt that
there was not room enough for more than one or at most two
banks with credit cards, and the larger banks would have
the advantage. In other instances, these smaller banks
expressed some interest in regional or even national
cooperative types of credit card schemes, but not as a
purely independent venture.
Despite the preceding reference to the somewhat
negative feelings of some banks, it should be remembered
that a majority of those contacted by the Federal Reserve
survey indicated that, usually for competitive reasons,
they were giving serious consideration to one or more of
the types of plans covered by this paper. Given the
assumption then that credit cards are here to stay and that
they will probably develop on a much larger scale in the
near future, a question relevant to the consideration of
their impact concerns the means or avenues by which the
movement will progress. Bankers interviewed suggested a




Geographically, the movement can spread locally
simply by individual banks adopting their own separate
plans. A second means is regional or statewide expansion
through some kind of interchange arrangement, involving a
pooling or joint system in which a group of banks shares
some of the development costs. An excellent example of the
joint system, the Midwest Bank Card, and its problems will
be presented more fully later in this paper. Extension
could also occur more directly at the national level by a
widespread acceptance of a nationally franchised plan,
such as BankAmericard, or by some type of national associa-
tion for interchange purposes. It is possible too that
the national credit card plans for banks now being sponsored
by nonbank organizations—American Express, Diners Club,
Carte Blanche---may in the future become more directly
competitive at the local retail card level.
The functional (in contrast to the geographic)
extension of credit card refers to the extension of the
processes involved, presumably in the direction of a more
automatic transfer of credit. Although any discussion in
this area is speculative at best, it is here that the
distinction between credit cards and the other types of
.
^''Association for the National interchange of Bank




plans described previously may become important, simply
because of the differing contribution which each may make
to the evolution of the payments process.
Quite aside from the normal practices and policies
of credit extension, regular bank retail credit card plans
are, in many small but perhaps important ways, familiarizing
the parties involved with the use of methods and equipment
somewhat comparable to those so essential to the automatic
transfer of credit. The use of the credit card itself
points up the problem of a simple and reliable means of
consumer identification, a major obstacle to any automatic
transfer system. Consumers and retailers become more
accustomed to the use of the imprinter, an admittedly crude
sort of terminal device but perhaps a necessary beginning.
Banks, retailers and consumers are even occasionally meeting
the problem of the immediate credit decision whenever a
purchase exceeds the "floor limit."
These aspects of the credit card type of transaction,
however, seem rather far removed from what would appear to
be the next logical step toward automatic credit transfer--
an "on-line" system involving the instantaneous transfer of
funds from the account of the consumer to that of the
retailer. Moreover, although many business writers appear
Touch-Tone Project, Storm's Shoes, Inc. with the
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convinced that this is the next step and that it will occur,
they disagree completely as to when. Some predict it as a
matter of two or three years while others feel that it is
in the much more distant future.
At this point the various kinds of plans described
above as being essentially competitors of credit cards may
become of crucial importance. This is especially true of
those programs which are extensions of the check credit
idea and involve the overdraft system in which the con-
sumer 1 s line of credit is tied directly to his checking
account. Although the consumer uses checks rather than a
charge card at the place of the transaction, he receives
automatic credit at the bank if he exceeds his deposit
balance. Since this overdraft feature makes "routine con-
sumer activity possible at all times," it is an important
aspect of the automatic transfer process. Hence, Robert V.
Head concludes: "The institutions that have taken this
step are thus progressing along the pathway toward
ultimately providing for automatic credit extension at the
point of a retail transaction 1 '
Bank of Delaware and the American Telephone and Telegraph
Company
.
*-R. E. Sprague, "System for Automatic Value
Exchange," Banking , June, 1966, p. 120.
2Robert V. Head, "The Checkless Society," Datama-
tion, March, 1966, p. 23.
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In a footnote to this conclusion Mr. Head also
says:
The reader may have observed that, also
during 1965, many banks set up consumer credit
card plans, patterned after the long-established
BankAmericard. Given the perspective that
present-day techniques for the verification and
extension of credit~~"are going to be dramatically
upgraded , these bank credit card ventures must
be viewed more as ill-advised retrogressions
than as imaginative breakthroughs into the
checkless future.
1
Although Mr. Head may be correct in this conclusion,
two comments concerning it might be in order. First, the
underlined portion of the statement draws attention to the
premise upon which the conclusion is based: namely, that
there will be drastic improvement in credit granting pro-
cedures. Clearly, Mr. Head is not asserting that credit
card plans as such are a backward step. Second, the credit
card movement itself may contribute significantly to the
very upgrading of "present-day techniques for the verifica-
tion and extension of credit" which Mr. Head poses as the
basis for subordinating the present credit card develop-
ments.
Hence, it seems reasonable to conclude at this
stage of the movement that both kinds of programs can




toward a more automatic transfer system: credit card
plans especially in the realm of problems at the point of
the retail transaction; revolving overdraft loan types of
plans particularly in the area of credit extension, by
tying the customer's line of credit directly to his check-
ing account. However, at present, credit cards are
receiving practically all the attention, even to the point
where the other plans are (to the irritation of their
originators) confused with, or referred to as, credit card
programs. Whether these types of plans can survive in
competition with credit cards is a matter of conjecture.
Some evidence suggests that in the minds of many
financial writers credit cards are the coming thing, and
other programs are regarded as more or less interim
defensive mechanisms, as perhaps not completely adequate
substitutes for credit cards but ones which they do not
wish their competitors to acquire either. For example, as
already noted, the so-called overdraft-travelers check plan
previously discussed has been accepted by over 130 banks
throughout the country. However, signing up is one thing
and putting into operation is another, since only three of
the seven banks contacted in the Federal Reserve Bank,
Boston, survey intended to implement the program within
six months after signing the franchise. The other four had
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no definite target date: one indicated its intention of
"taking another look at the situation and then decide
whether we want to proceed"; another had no specific time
frame in. mind "but expects it to be offered soon"; the
third indicated that it signed up to forestall its competi-
tion and "we have no immediate plans for starting and do
not expect it will occur for at least another year"; the
fourth bank also took on a franchise for competitive
reasons as another means of expanding its consumer services,
but later proceeded in launching its own credit card plan,
and the franchise had been shelved until its own charge
card program was operating.
That the delay in implementing the franchise, after
it had been purchased, is not peculiar to New England was
indicated by J.. R. Hambleton in his series on credit cards
in the American Banker :
Some banks that signed up for it did so only
to keep their competition from getting the service.
Upon learning of this, Mr. Green [president of
First Financial Marketing Group which is marketing
the program] had the contract changed. A bank
signing up from now on must make a major effort
within six months or lose its exclusive franchise
.
Hence, the future of the overdraft type of program
may be less certain than that of the credit card.
J. R. Hambleton, "Bancardcheck Seeks to Provide




Nevertheless, the overdraft feature, considered by some to
be an important function in any automatic credit transfer
system, has been introduced. Possibly the next development
in the credit card mechanism may be the mass inducement of
the cardholder to become a depositor, with an overdraft
privilege tied to his checking account in lieu of the
present pre-arranged line-of-credit type of authorization.
If the banks succeed in this, they will have taken another
step toward a more automatic transfer process in the sense
that the distance will not seem so great to the substitution
of an identification card for the credit card.l
Moreover, as all of these programs (of the type
covered by this paper) multiply and expand, both geograph-
ically and functionally, they will intensify the need for
solving several, kinds of problems which heretofore have
been regarded as being almost entirely within the realm of
the checkless society. For example, there are the increas-
ing problems of (1) customer identification (more card-
holders spread over a greater area) , (2) standardization of
equipment (especially if interchange arrangements become
common)
, (3) faster and more accurate credit verification,
extension and interchange (particularly as the "on-line"
1Robert V. Head, "The Checkless Society,"
Datamation, March, 1966, p. 24.
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type of procedure is approached, regardless of the steps
by which it occurs)
. The increasing recognition of and
attempt to solve these problems by individual banks and,
more important perhaps, by organized groups will itself
ease the way to further developments.
On the other hand, while credit card and similar
programs may well be a step in the direction of an automa-
tic electro-credit transfer system, there is real disagree-
ment over the speed with which this stage will be achieved,
if ever. Several "realists" have given very practical and
convincing reasons for their belief that while the
"checkless, cashless" society may ultimately be reached, it
will be by a much slower and more tortuous process of trial
and error than its planners seem to envision.
For example, while agreeing that "there is unques-
tionable merit in the possibilities suggested by the
universal information interchange concept that leads to the
'cashless 1 society," A. R. Zipf, vice president of Bank of
America, feels that more realism is necessary before any
real progress can take place. In particular, he poses the
problem of obtaining a satisfactory return on the very
The American Bankers Association National
Automatic Conference maintains Project Committees in all
the problem areas and provides for the exchange of
information and new solutions.
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substantial investment required by the types of systems now
contemplated. Mr. Zipf, using the BankAmericard program
for purposes of comparison, analyzes briefly the potential
benefits and problems involved in a shift to an automatic
system, "in three areas: 1) merchants* operations, 2)
cardholder utilization, and 3) bank operation." Mr. Zipf
finds it difficult at this time to discover sufficient net
advantages to the parties most concerned in each of these
three areas to justify an expectation of adequate return on
the banks' investment.
Charles Block, vice president of Chase Manhattan
Bank, reaches very similar conclusions but by a somewhat
different process. In presenting "an approach suggestive
of how to research the checkless society," Mr. Block finds
that the check system is far from obsolete. He refers to
some recent developments (e.g. better check cashing
facilities, overdraft banking, automatic bill payment,
payroll distribution, video tapes, credit cards, MICR
encoding) as suggestive of ways in which the check system
has been and can be further improved in order to enable
banks to handle more efficiently the check volume and
fulfill better the needs of their customers in a variety of
A. R. Zipf, "A Practical View of Universal Credit,"
Datamation, March, 1966, pp. 121-122.
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ways. Hence, Mr. Block feels that for the near-term future
the continued improvement of the present system is a more
realistic goal than the "checkless society"; that society
will probably "require more than one debt settlement
mechanism in volume; for example, cash, checks, automatic
money transfers"; that presently "the long term potential
of the 'checkless 1 society is completely unknown"; that
"there is little danger of it occurring overnight right
under our noses before we can do anything about it." 1
These latter points of view have been mentioned not
because they prove anything but simply because they seem to
be in harmony with some of the data presented in this
paper. While there is unquestionably a surge of interest
in credit cards and related consumer credit plans the number
of such programs actually in operation or immediately pend-
ing does not suggest any appreciable impact in the near
2future on the volume of checks or other aspects of the
payment mechanism. Nevertheless, the increasing competi-
tion among banks and between banks and other sources of
Charles Block, "Serious Questions Need Answers
En Route to Checkless Society," American Banker , July, 28,
1966, pp. 4, 5, 9.
2
In 1955, 14 billion checks were written; it is
expected that by 1975 over 27 billion checks will be pro-
cessed annually. The present annual cost of clearing
checks is estimated at between 3.3 and 3.5 billion dollars.
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financial services as well as the increasing demand for
banking services (especially check volume) will surely
accentuate the attempts by individual banks (and perhaps
groups of banks) to maintain and improve their position
through more computerization and the adoption of programs
aimed at reducing, rerouting, and replacing checks. Hence,
the "movement" toward the types of plans considered here
could speed up significantly in the near future.
Compatible Bank Credit Cards
Overview
The compatible bank credit card has radically
altered the framework of the banking industry. Every bank
contemplating entry into the credit card business, as well
as every existing card operation, must consider the
implications of compatibility. Indeed, compatibility
itself may represent a more important development for the
commercial banking industry than the credit card; it may be
a major step into the "checkless society."
The first compatible bank credit card system to
commence large-scale operations was the Midwest Bank Card
System, which began to function in November, 1966. This
system was not without its problems. During the first year
of operations losses occurred because of frauds as a result

61
of cards falling into the hands of persons other than the
owners. Cards were often stolen from mail boxes, and in
the mass mailing process some families received fifteen or
more cards. It was also reported that one card was made
out to a dog in Chicago.
The adverse publicity associated with this "plunge"
of the member banks in the Midwest Bank Card System
resulted in introduction of the House of Representatives
Bill H. R. 12646, "To prohibit federally insured banks from




In testimony on this bill before the House Commit-
tee on Banking and Currency, Miss Betty Furness voiced her
opinion that the issuance of unsolicited credit cards in
Chicago was "a particularly offensive form of junk mail."
It was her contention, and she considered it to be that of
the public at large, that banks should be prohibited from
3
mailing unsolicited credit cards.
Chicago's Credit Card Crisis," Business Week
,
July 15, 1967, p. 35.
2
"Curbs on Credit Cards Issued by Banks Being
Sought by Patman in House Bill," The Wall Street Journal ,
August 29, 1967, p. 28.
3Testimony of Betty Furness, Special Assistant to
the President for Consumer Affairs, Before the House Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency, November 8, 1967.
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Before the Committee on the same day, K. A.
Randall, Chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corpora-
tion defended the action of the banks involved. He pointed
out the need to create a broad base as rapidly as possible
and said that procedures were in effect to select out "hot
cards." He supported the banks by saying:
Bank credit card plans typically require procedures
for maintaining a very close tether on the individ-
ual card holder's use of the instrument. This is
obviously good banking because a customer obligated
beyond his means is simply a problem rather than an
asset to the bank.
. . . Premature and inappro-
priate legislation on credit cards could damage the
banking system. As with any innovation, there is
need for a period of testing.
1
A third person to testify was Andrew F. Brimmer,
Governor, Federal Reserve System, who stated relative to
mass mailing of credit cards in the Chicago area:
The banks did this with the realization that there
would be some problems and some losses during the
initial stages. But, as a matter of business
judgment, they found this procedure helpful in
order to sign up merchants. They believed that
the total costs of launching their plans would
have been less, even including losses, than would
have been the case if a slower buildup had been
undertaken through requiring individual applica-
tions for credit cards. All of the banks con-
tacted, however, indicated that after their plans
had been launched in this fashion they relied
primarily on applications as a source of new
cardholders
.
Statement of Chairman K. A. Randall, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, before the House Banking
and Currency Committee, November 8, 1967.
2Statement of Andrew F. Brimmer, Member, Board of

63
House Bill H. R. 12646 died in Committee.
Within the first six months of operation, the Mid-
west Bank Card System instituted twenty-six changes to
combat fraud. These included a "zero floor" for some
merchants, who were required to clear every card purchase;
confirmation of purchases with the card owner if a card
was used several times in one day, and having the new card
sent out by registered mail—at a cost of eighty cents per
letter.
The trial, errors and experience of mass mailing of
credit cards was not a step backward. The knowledge gained2
and the successful results obtained after an initial shock
of losses has made the Midwest Bank Card System a model
which is now being followed throughout the nation. The
Intermountain Bankcard Association with member banks in
Utah, Idaho and parts of Wyoming, Nevada and Colorado was
added to the growing list of regional compatible systems in
3December, 1967.
Governors of Federal Reserve System, before the Committee
on Banking and Currency, House of Representatives, November
8, 1967.
"Chicago's Credit Card Crisis," loc. cit .
2
"Banks Tell First Year of Credit Cards—Hectic,"
Chicago Tribune , September 24, 1967.
~>
"Three Banks in Utah Form Group to Offer Credit
Card," Wall Street Journal, December 14, 1967.
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The Midwest Bank Card System initially encompassed
the operations of five separate bank credit cards in the
Chicago area and has now been extended to cover the three
states of Illinois, Indiana and Michigan. There are a
number of other compatible operations in existence or con-
templated, including BankAmericard, the California Bankcard
Association and Interbankard. All of these plans have a
Sfreat deal in common and even their differences are instruc-
tive. The focus of this section will be on compatibility
as exemplified by the Midwest Bank Card System, although
comparisons will be drawn to other plans.
Department store credit cards, oil company cards
or airline credit cards are generally issued by a merchandi-
ser who is prepared to accept the card in a credit trans-
action. This is fundamentally a two-party relationship
between the merchant and the customer (Figure 1)
.
The material used in this section on Compatible
Bank Credit Cards has been gathered from the Midwest Card
System. Interviews were conducted December 19 and 20, 1967
with Robert M. Martindale, President, Midwest Bank Card
System, Inc., and the following personnel at member banks;
B. J. McGuigan, Assistant Cashier, The First National Bank
of Chicago, Michael C. Thometz, Administrative Assistant,
Town and Country Charge, Division of Continental Illinois
National Bank and Trust Company of Chicago, and B. Kenneth
West, Assistant Division Administrator, Charge Card Divi-
sion, Harris Trust and Savings Bank. This writer must take












Fig. 1.—Merchant Credit Card Plan
The typical single bank credit card is issued by a
bank to its customers and is accepted by any participating
purveyor of goods and services, relying on the bank's
agreement to assume the credit risk by purchasing the sales
slips so generated on a non-recourse basis. This is in
essence a three-party relationship; the single bank is the
central pivot in the relationship since it issues the card
to the customer and also enrolls the merchant (Figure 2)





, Sale of Merchandise v
^ ^
CUSTOMER
Fig. 2. --Single Bank Credit Card Plan
Other examples of three-party credit card systems:
the most familiar are the travel and entertainment cards
issued by American Express, Carte Blanche and Diners' Club.
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A compatible bank credit card system is essentially
a four-party relationship, since at least two banks are
involved in addition to the customer and the merchant.
Each bank issues cards to its customers and enrolls mer-
chants to accept cards, with the understanding that card-



















From the point of view of the merchant and the
customer the basic principle of compatibility is simplicity
itself. Every customer holding a compatible card has the
right and is encouraged to use his card for every merchant
enrolled in the system. The customer does not care which
bank enrolled the merchant. Conversely, every merchant
enrolled in the system is willing and eager to accept all
compatible cards because his bank has agreed to purchase
from him all sales slips generated by the use of such cards,
The merchant does not care which bank issued the card.
The banks which are members of a compatible system
are basically committed to the principle of interchange.
When a compatible system is in operation, each member bank
receives from its merchants sales slips generated by cards
issued by any member banks. The primary function of a
compatible system is to arrange the interchange of such
slips between the "merchant bank" which purchased the sales
slips from its merchants, and the "card-issuing bank" which
issued the card so used. From the bank's point of view,
therefore, the compatible system is one of exchanging
valuable pieces of paper. Bankers are no strangers to this




If the first basic principle is a compatible system
in interchange, a cooperative activity, the second prin-
ciple is, paradoxically, independence. There are two
principal sources of income in the bank credit card
business. The most important is the interest paid by
cardholders when they elect extended payment of their
revolving accounts. The other source is the discount paid
by the merchant to induce the bank to purchase his credit
card sales slips. In all of the existing and projected
compatible systems the member banks are free to compete in
these matters. Indeed, this independence extends to three
areas:
(1) The customer relationship. Each member bank
is free to select the persons to whom it will issue credit
cards, to establish limits on the credit extended and to
set its own price for the services rendered to its customers
As a corollary each member bank bears the risks and reaps
the rewards of its own credit card operation.
(2) The merchant relationship. Each member bank is
free to enroll any merchant in the system and to establish
its own price structure in dealing with merchants. A mer-
chant is free to deal with the bank of its choice.
(3) The correspondent bank relationship. In the
Midwest Bank Card System a third dimension of independence
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has emerged. Several of the larger banks which are members
of the Midwest System have made arrangements with other
banks, usually smaller correspondent banks, for an indirect
participation in the System. By affiliating with one of
the member banks, the correspondents are in a position to
serve as the initial bank of deposit for their own merchants
and to insure that their customers are issued Midwest credit
cards. In general, the Midwest System does not attempt to
govern this relationship between the member bank and the
indirect "participating bank." In fact, a wide variety of
arrangements have been offered to participating banks. The
two areas of economic importance are the sharing of the
merchant discount and the sharing of the risk and income
from the cardholder relationship.
At this, point it might be appropriate to make a few
observations about the market functioning of a compatible
credit card system, before entering into a discussion of
the mechanics of such a system. One preliminary clarifica-
tion must be made. Some of the existing and contemplated
systems are designed primarily to achieve compatibility
between bank credit card operations in widely scattered
areas throughout the country. With some exceptions, this
is true of the, BankAmericard system involving the Bank of
America and other banks which is has franchised, as well
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as the contemplated Interbankard system. Obviously where
the member banks are widely scattered the opportunities for
direct competition are at a minimum, and the primary pur-
pose of interchange is to expand the geographic scope of
acceptability of each individual bank credit card. On the
other hand, the Midwest Bank Card System was conceived in
the first instance as embodying compatibility in a single
market in which the member banks would be in direct compe-
tition with one another. It will come as no surprise to
anyone to discover that competition in the Midwest System
has been intense.
Competition
This competition has extended to all three areas of
independence outlined above: the customer relationship,
the merchant relationship and the correspondent bank rela-
tionship.
With respect to the customer relationship it must
be pointed out that virtually every bank credit card program
which has been launched, whether successfully or unsuccess-
fully, commenced with a mass distribution of unsolicited
cards. In the Midwest System the principal competitors
bent every effort to obtain the maximum distribution of
their own cards. The result was inevitably a certain amount
of overlapping and an intense effort by each bank to promote
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the use of its own card.
The area of merchant relationships was even more
intensely competitive. In a compatible system a merchant
need only sign with one member bank to enjoy the activity
of all cardholders of all member banks. Since every member
bank was selling basically the same product to merchants,
that is, the same cardholder base, the struggle for merchant
enrollment concentrated on various forms of price competi-
tion. This price competition was influenced by the fact
that the merchant bank in the Midwest System retains the
entire merchant discount or other merchant income, none of
which is passed forward to the card-issuing bank (this is a
result of the fact that interchange of sales slips between
merchant bank and card-issuing bank takes place at par, a
point which will be further discussed later) . The merchant
bank must bear certain expenses in connection with the
enrolling of merchants and the processing of sales slips,
as well as certain economic risks in connection with
charge-backs, which also will be discussed below. These
expenses and risks influence the pricing process.
The competition for merchants has interesting
effects. In a compatible system involving banks in the .
same market area every merchant bank will obtain the
benefits of activity at its merchants by the cardholders

72
of other banks. In the Midwest System it may be estimated
that as much as 50 per cent of all credit card transactions
involve an interchange between the merchant bank and the
card-issuing bank. The precise distribution of benefits
depends upon the success of each bank in obtaining valuable
merchant relationships. If the compatible system, as a
whole, encourages a wider use of bank credit cards in the
community than a multiplicity of independent bank card
systems, then the member banks will profit as well as the
merchants and cardholders.
The third principal area of competition, the cor-
respondent bank relationship, provides the clue to one
peculiarity of the Midwest System. Each of the major banks
which are members of the System has chosen to do business
under a trade name which does not directly identify the
bank in question. The reason for this is that each of
these banks recognizes that its correspondents would be
reluctant to participate if the name of the principal bank
was prominently featured on cards issued to customers of
the correspondent. The participation of correspondent
banks was important to the larger Illinois banks because,
in a unit-banking state, it is difficult for a large down-
town bank on its own to reach a large number of retail
customers and retail merchants. On the other hand, the
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participating banks were given a low risk method of staying
in the total bank credit card picture. Whether smaller
banks will choose to go it alone, as some have done in the
Midwest System, or will remain affiliated with a major card-
issuing bank, only time will tell.
The compatible feature of the Midwest Bank Card
System has undoubtedly fostered intense competition between
the member banks. It is equally obvious that the effects
of this competition have not been an unmitigated evil.
First of all, the principal competitors in the Midwest
System would have been competitors even if the system did
not exist. Indeed, but for compatibility, there would
probably be at least four separate bank credit card opera-
tions in Chicago today. The result would probably have
been chaos in the minds of both the cardholders and mer-
chants. Until the Midwest System began operations, most
bank credit card plans operated without any significant
competition from other banks in the same market area.
Obviously, this situation will not continue for long as
banks everywhere enter the business. .Competition is
inevitable; only the form competition will take is open for
discussion. This leads to the second point. The existence
of intense competition in a compatible framework has
maximized the market impact of the introduction of bank
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cards in the Midwest area. The system is working; activity
is high; all of the members stand to profit from this fact
in the long run.
The Card
Bank credit systems are almost universally based on
the familiar plastic credit card with embossed characters
used to imprint the customer's name and account number on
the sales slip. In a compatible system the cards have
uniform physical specification so that each merchant will
be able to use one standard imprinter. The physical
standards are easy to establish. The tough question, how-
ever, concerns the appearance of the compatible card,
because the two basic principles of compatibility and inde-
pendence yield conflicting answers. The independence of
the member banks suggests that the card of each bank have
a different appearance to enhance product identification.
On the other hand, compatibility requires that each customer
instantly recognize every merchant establishment where he
may use his card and that every sales person in a merchant
establishment instantly recognizes all acceptable cards.
This recognition is normally achieved by reproducing the
card format in a decal to be displayed by the merchant.
Obviously, if each member bank has a unique card format, no
merchant could possibly display all of the relevant decals
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and confusion would be inevitable.
The Midwest Bank Card System has solved this
problem by adopting a common logo identifying the system
and a common visual format for the card and merchant
decal (Figure 4) . Each member of the Midwest System is
entitled to use its own distinctive "sub-system" trade name
or symbol on its cards so long as the uniform visual impact
of the card is not disturbed. All merchant decals are
identical and do not refer to any such "sub-system." Bank-
Americard and California Bankcard Association have adopted
a similar solution, with even less opportunity for sub-
system identification. All of these systems have in effect
decided that a uniform format is necessary in order to
communicate the idea of compatibility and that sub-system
identification must take a subordinate position.
On the other hand, the present position of Inter-
bankard is that each card-issuing bank will be entitled to
maintain its own unique card format. Interbankard plans to
adopt a common system logo, but this logo may be placed
anywhere on the back or front of the card. The merchant,
on the other hand, would presumably display two decals, one
identifying his local card affiliation, the other a special
Interbankard decal carrying the system logo.
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Fig. 4. --Card Format
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these two approaches. If the Interbankard approach works,
it will be relatively simple to create a nationwide com-
patible bank card since no existing card-issuing bank will
be required to make any drastic changes to its card. On
the other hand, if compatibility will only work with a more
or less uniform card format, then the transition to a
uniform national card may require sacrifices by all exist-
ing card issuers. The answer to this question may be
different depending on whether compatibility is conceived
as operating in a local market between competitors or in an
inter-market context. As was pointed out earlier, current
trends indicate that the inter-market context might be
short-lived as card systems proliferate in many local
markets. In a local market situation with maximum inter-
change between cards, the uniform format might well be
essential.
There is another important aspect to the card
format problem. A bank may wish to distinguish between
those of its cardholders who are entitled to use their
cards in the local market and those who have nationwide
privileges. If a national compatible credit card system
adopts a rigid uniform card format, any particular bank
which wishes to issue national cards only to some of its
cardholders will have to issue a different card for card-
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holders with local privileges only. If the national system
only requires a national logo somewhere on the card, the
bank can easily distinguish between cardholders with
national and local privileges.
Customer Relations
Since the essence of a compatible system is the
interchangeability of all compatible cards, great care
must be taken that all merchants treat all cardholders
equally. The contract between the merchant bank and the
merchant must obligate the merchant to accept all compatible
cards and to do so without discrimination in terms. The
merchant cannot refuse to accept the compatible card of an
issuer with which he has no merchant agreement. It is
also normal to provide that the merchant will treat credit
card transactions on the same terms as cash transactions.
Non-discrimination at the merchant level must be
reinforced by equality of treatment at the merchant bank
level. If the merchant must accept all compatible cards,
the merchant bank must agree to accept all sales slips
generated by such cards, including, obviously, those of
other card-issuing banks. Similarly, the merchant bank
cannot discriminate between different compatible cards in
dealing with merchants; for example; the merchant bank
cannot establish different discount rates for purchasing
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sales slips generated by different cards. If the merchant
bank were permitted to so discriminate, the merchant would
inevitably favor the cards which carried the lower discount
rate.
Operating Rules
Every compatible bank credit card system must have
some uniform operating rules governing the various aspects
of credit card transactions. Many of these rules are rela-
tively non-controversial. For example, almost all bank
credit card plans instruct the merchant that he is free,
without further ado, to consummate a card transaction under
a specific dollar amount, say $50, which is generally
referred to as the "floor limit." The merchant is required
to contact an authorization center for permission to accept
the card in a transaction over the floor limit, if he
expects the bank to accept the sales slip on a non-recourse
basis. The authorization center has current credit
information on each account and is in a position to make a
credit judgment on each transaction. An authorization,
once given, is noted on the sales slip. The floor limit is
obviously an important protective device and is also an
effective way of repossessing credit cards being fraudu-
lently used or those where the customer has seriously
exceeded his credit limit.
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From a marketing viewpoint it is important that the
sales person in the merchant establishment need not remember
a different floor limit for each card he honors. Hence,
most compatible situations have established a uniform floor
limit which may vary by merchant category, but is the same
for all compatible cards at any one merchant.
This example leads naturally to another operating
characteristic system— the charge-back. The merchant bank
places into clearing all sales slips generated by cards of
other card-issuers and the latter banks are required to
accept all such slips. If, however, a given slip evidences
a transaction in excess of the floor limit and no authori-
zation was granted to the merchant, the card-issuing bank
may charge the slip back to the merchant bank. This charge-
back technique is one of the basic sanctions for preserving
the integrity of the system. The Midwest System discovered
in the course of its operations that many such charge-back
provisions are required, covering a broad range of problems
in addition to the floor limit. Additional examples of
such charge-backs include sales slips - involving cards on
the hot card list or expired cards, sales slips presented
after a specified time has elapsed from the date of the
transaction, and so on.
A compatible system occasionally introduces an
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unavoidable element of inflexibility into a credit card
system. The problem of customer complaints is a good
example of this. Inevitably, some customers will be dis-
satisfied with the goods or services received from a
merchant and will not receive satisfaction from the mer-
chant. Until the customer receives satisfaction, he simply
will not pay his account. In the typical single bank
credit card system, the bank usually attempts to insulate
itself from such problems by providing in the merchant
agreement that the merchant will be responsible for resolv-
ing all such complaints and will accept charge-backs when-
ever the customer so complains. Frequently, the cardholder
agreement also provides that the cardholder will pay the
bank even though there is a dispute with the merchant.
Despite these provisions, the bank is in the middle. Some
merchants have a sufficiently strong bargaining position so
that the bank cannot insist on automatic charge-back in
every case of customer complaint and some customers are
sufficiently important to the bank so that it will not
pursue a dissatisfied customer. As a practical matter,
therefore, the bank must often act as an arbitrator between
the customer and the merchant. Sometimes the bank is left
holding the bag.
In a single bank system these problems are trouble-
some but since there is only one bank involved its judgment
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will ultimately control the situation. However, in a
compatible system customer complaints will arise in cases
where the merchant bank and the card-issuing bank are
different. One way to solve the problem would be to set up
a system of arbitration between banks in which the arbitra-
tor would decide whether the customer or the merchant is
right. In the Midwest System this solution was rejected
and the rule was adopted that the merchant bank must accept
a charge-back where the customer has made a written com-
plaint. The merchant bank then must decide whether or not
to pass the charge-back on to the merchant.
The Central Facility
The Midwest Bank Card System, like most other com-
patible systems, has found it necessary to create a separate
entity to manage the operations of the system. This has
taken the form of a not-for-profit membership corporation,
the formal organization of which will be briefly discussed
below. At this point, attention will be given to the role
of the central facility in the operations of the system.
At the present time, the Midwest central facility has two
principal functions. First, it is the owner of the rights
to use the system service marks: the name "Midwest Bank
Card" and the system logo and card format. All member
banks are licensed to use these service marks in connection
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with their credit card operations.
The second function of the Midwest central facility
is to formulate and enforce the rules for the operation of
the system. Some of these rules have already been dis-
cussed, such as the physical and visual specifications of
the Midwest credit card, the establishment of floor limits
and charge-back rules. These operating rules have developed
from a four-page statement of general principles into a set
of documents running for more than 75 pages. Although the
assistance of outside consultants and other technical
experts was essential in the process of rule-making, the
major credit for the development of these rules must go to
the banks themselves. As they began to operate a compatible
system, they attempted to solve the problems which arose,
one by one. The development process continues.
The Midwest Bank Card System has not attempted to
create a central facility which would perform extensive
services for the member banks in connection with their
credit card operations. On the other hand, the California
Bankcard Association is contemplating .such an active central
facility. In that association, the central facility will
maintain substantial computer installations which will per-
form virtually all of the processing related to merchant
and cardholder accounting and the clearing function. In
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addition, by contractual arrangement with an independent
corporation, the California Association apparently will
centralize the credit authorization function in one agency,
following the separate instructions of each member bank for
transactions over the system floor limits.
Member Bank Responsibility
In the Midwest System, on the other hand, each mem-
ber bank is responsible for processing its own paper, main-
taining its own computer facilities, purchasing its own
supplies, doing its own advertising and operating its own
credit authorization centers. Apart from the licensing of
the system service marks, the only services performed by the
system are to provide a simple clearing mechanism and to
arrange for the publication of a system-wide hot card list.
However, even these services have been kept to a minimum.
The clearing function, for example, is simply the designation
of a time and place where the member banks meet each day
and purchase from one another the sales slips to be inter-
changed. The hot card list, which is made up of cards which
merchants are notified not to honor, is published by the
system but is distributed by each merchant bank to its own
merchants
.
There is, by the way, nothing in the Midwest rules
to prohibit one or more banks from pooling their resources
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and creating an active central facility to perform functions
such as those to be performed by the California Bankcard
Association. The Midwest System simply has not yet felt
any pressing need to engage in such activities.
Clearing Process
It is probably too early in the development of
compatible bank credit card systems to say very much about
the clearing mechanism as such. The Midwest System, for
example, is using the most primitive clearing mechanism.
Interchange is accomplished simply by a reciprocal purchase
of sales slips presented at the interchange. Other systems
have been proposed to utilize the facilities of the normal
check clearing system, but a description of these proposals
is beyond the scope of this paper. Eventually a system will
undoubtedly be developed to permit the electronic transfer
of information concerning credit card transactions . Exper-
ience will undoubtedly bring about greater sophistication
in this area.
There is, however, one important question of prin-
ciple involved in the clearing process. This concerns the
treatment of the discount or other fees paid by merchants
for the privilege of selling sales slips to the merchant
bank. It has already been pointed out that the basic
principle of independence requires that the merchant
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discount rates be independently set by the merchant bank.
This is true in all existing and contemplated compatible
systems. However, there is considerable variation in
determining the bank which ultimately receives the merchant
discount. Three principal alternatives may be identified:
(1) In the Midwest System the entire merchant dis-
count is retained by the merchant bank, that is, by the
bank which enrolled the merchant in the system. (In those
cases where a correspondent bank acts as an intermediary
between the merchant and the full member of the system,
there is often a sharing of the discount between these two
banks, but this is only a detail.)
(2) In the BankAmericard system the entire merchant
discount is passed forward from the merchant bank to the
bank which issued the card used in a particular transaction.
In Interbankard, an interchange assessment, which is normally
less than the merchant discount, is passed forward from the
merchant bank to the cardholder bank.
(3) In the proposed California Bankcard Association
the merchant bank retains the merchant discount; however,
it is contemplated that merchant banks will be required to
pay fees to the active central facility based on their mer-
chant activity which will cover the expenses of the facility
and a joint advertising program, and also provide for a
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small payment to the card-issuing bank on every transaction
based on one of its cards.
Opinions obviously differ on the proper recipient
of the merchant discount. There are many arguments relating
to the respective contributions of the merchant bank and
the card-issuing bank but these cannot finally resolve the
question. The Midwest experience in operating a compatible
system in a local market does suggest two observations;
first, as has already been mentioned, in a local compatible
situation, there is a great deal of reciprocal interchange
of sales slips, in which each bank earns merchant discount
on the activities of the cardholders of other banks. Since
the income flow is reciprocal, the net gain or loss to any
bank under the Midwest rule is much less than the total
amount of interchange, although there are indeed some banks
which benefit more than others. Secondly, the rule that
the merchant discount remains with the merchant bank greatly
simplifies the clearing process. Since all clearing is at
par, there is no need to compute discounts or any other
compensating fee. If the compatible bank credit card system
is to become a national system, involving a large number of
independent banks interchanging with one another, it is
obvious that clearing at par will be almost essential. This
simplification may justify marginal inequities in the income




A compatible system is generally governed by an
active board of directors or other governing body selected
by the member banks. In the Midwest System, the board of
directors is elected using a system of weighted voting in
which each member bank receives voting rights generally
proportionate to its activity as a merchant and card-issuing
bank. The voting rights at any membership meeting are dis-
tributed in accordance with the following formula:
(a) 5 per cent of the votes are distributed to the
members on a per capita basis; each member shares equally in
this portion.
(b) 20 per cent of the votes are distributed to the
members in proportion to the number of merchant transactions
handled in the preceding calendar quarter.
(c) 75 per cent of the votes are distributed to the
members in proportion to the number of sales slips billed
to cardholders in the preceding calendar quarter.
Furthermore, election of directors is by cumulative
voting which assures that the majority will rule and the
minority will be represented. By the same token, the normal
expenses of the Midwest System are generally distributed in
accordance with the same formula, so that voting power and
financial responsibility are parallel. Of course, the
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Midwest System, which is primarily a rule-making body, has
relatively small expenses compared to those which would be
incurred by a system with an active central facility.
Scope of Bank Credit Cards
The increased participation of banks in the credit
card business is of interest to the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the
Federal Reserve Board. Beginning in April, 1967, these
agencies have required Call Reports which provide informa-
tion concerning bank credit cards and check credit plans.
As of April 25, 1967, 627 insured commercial banks
reported outstanding credit under either credit card or
check credit plans for a total amount of $809 million. The
October, 1967 report indicated an increase in number of
banks to 848, reporting $1,137 million outstanding credit
under the plans
.
With the increased importance of bank credit cards
the Federal Reserve System's examiners are reviewing and
appraising the policies and practices _ followed by the banks
The Call Report will be a continuing procedure to provide
information to the Agencies.




The use of such terms as "moneyless banking" or the
"checkless, cashless society" is bringing attention to what
has been referred to as a futuristic era of superautomation
and supercredit.
Many reasons are advanced for the adoption of the
new and exciting types of money transfers. Paper work
involved in the movement of checks has increased to a rate
that threatens to paralyze the banking industry^ present
network for transferring funds. Tests have been conducted
on the use of cards and on-line computers for the transfer
of funds, and further studies are being conducted by the
American Bankers Association.
Walter E. Trabbold, comptroller of the Bank of
Delaware, after conducting two on-line tests, is of the
.
. 2
opinion that electro-banking is feasible.
There are no technical reasons why banks shouldn't
begin looking into an expansion of this magnitude
in scope of their customer services. The pilot
project with the shoe chain has showed us that the
requirements for a small system can easily be met
by equipment available now. Large-scale systems
"Money Goes Electronic in the 1970s," Business
Week, January 13, 1968, p. 54.
Walter E. Trabbold, "A New Perspective on Banking
Automation," Progress in Information Systems . Printed by




pose some equipment problems, but none that won't
disappear before such a system could be imole-
mented.
Mr. Trabbold goes on to make the point of the importance of
increasing customer service as a requirement in the coming
age of electro-banking.
The biggest problem banks face is marketing.
. . .
Marketing is not a major factor in reducing costs;
it is in making profits through customer services.
. . .
Recognizing and exploiting the customer-
service opportunities presented by the new tech-
nologies will require a higher degree of market-
ing creativity than the banking industry has shown
in the past.
Full electro-banking will require the use of on-line
computer equipment with transfer terminals capable of con-
necting any merchant with any bank. Most experts in the
field envision the complete program of the capability of
positive identification of the customer at each transaction
fully developed within the next ten to fifteen years.
Although the technology of the computers, the
method or methods of positive identification of customer,
security and information files are not within the scope of
this paper, the "end-product" is considered as a part of
the customer services referred to by Mr. Trabbold. This
In 1958, automation participation was limited to
approximately 200 banks; in 1966, according to a survey by
the American Bankers Association, there were 943 banks with
computers, 2,055 banks using off-premises computer services
and 1,358 banks in the active automation planning stage.
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"end product"—the monthly statement of transactions includ-
ing the automatic deposit of salary and wages, credit card
and check transactions, and interest on loans or overdrafts
is no doubt the part of electro-banking of greatest interest
to the customer and reflects the scope of customer services
which will be marketed.
The flexibility in the use of a customer's banking
services is demonstrated in the explanation of the following
"typical" statement of an "electro-account" (Figure 5)
.
The statement is similar to those many Americans are
now accustomed to receiving from their banks each month. An
examination of the details, however, points out some of the
changes electro-banking will bring.
The first line under the bank's name and Mr. Doe's
address reads "summary data for account 809-76-8304 as of
2-28-67." The number 2-28-67 represents the date of the
statement. However, the other number is an important ele-
ment of electro-banking. It is Mr. Doe's Social Security
number, which many informed sources contend will be the
personal identification number that will serve every citizen
of the United States in all financial and government trans-
actions. Thus, for income tax, bank accounts, social
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Starting on the right side of the statement the next
entry reads "available line of credit $1,000.00." In the
electro-banking society almost everyone will have an auto-
matic credit available, the amount of which will depend on
the customer's monthly income and credit risk rating.
The type of charges, their frequency and cost are
shown next. The first charges listed are pre-authorized,
symbolized by the letter P. Pre-authorized charges and
deposits represent one of the major steps toward the check-
less society. It means that payroll checks, dividends and
other monies that are accrued regularly during the year will
be deposited automatically in the bank account. In the
case of pre-authorized charges, items such as mortgage
loans, utility bills and insurance premiums will be deducted
automatically
.
The second type of charge is telephone transfers.
The touch-tone telephone permits data to be sent over tele-
phone wires into the bank's computers. Cash transfers will
also be made over the touch-tone telephone using local
merchants for the distribution of the -cash.
At the end of each month a statement such as this
"^Proven successful in the Bank of Delaware, Storm's
Shoes Test Program. Francis F. Smulski, "Touch-Tone Pro-
ject," Progress in Information Systems, op. cit., p. 57.
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will be sent to Mr. Doe, but inquiries can be made at any
time. Four inquiries were made during the month, probably
by Mrs. Doe, at a total cost of 60 cents to the account.
The total service charge to Mr. Doe's account was
$3.10 but at some time during the month he withdrew $291.17
more than he had on deposit. The bank's computer, seeing
that Mr. Doe has an advance line of credit of $1000.00,
immediately entered the credit for the $291.17 at a charge
of 30 cents for three days. The total bank charge on the
account for the month came to $3.40.
On the left side of the statement is shown a summary
of the dollar amount of the month's transactions.
The itemized listings of transactions are made in
a nine-column chart. The first column shows the date that
the funds were transferred either into or out of the
account. The second column lists the items while the third
column shows the actual date of the transaction. The fourth
column identifies the type of transaction, the fifth the
amount and the sixth registers whether any sort of discount
was given. Debit, credit and balance .records fill the
remaining columns.
The first item in the statement shows the balance
from the previous month of $280.66. The second item is the
preauthorized payment of $80.16 to Sterns Department Store.
The next item is the automatic preauthorized transfer of Mr.
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Doe's earnings by United States Steel to the bank account.
In the fourth transaction the bank computer has
automatically transferred $250.50 to Mr. Doe's savings
account because the amount of funds available in the account
at the moment exceeded a present limit.
The fifth item is a preauthorized mortgage payment.
The sixth item shows the purchase of $40 worth of
goods from the A & P food stores. It also demonstrates one
of the merchandising techniques that will come with the
checkless society. It is notable that the date of the
transaction in the third column was February 2 while the
date of fund transference was not until February 5. What
happened was that when Mrs. Doe presented her cash card to
the A & P clerk to pay for the groceries, the transaction
was recorded but the funds were not transferred because the
store was offering three days' money float as a buying
incentive in much the same way Green Stamps or other stamps
are offered today.
Another incentive offered by stores in the checkless
society will be the discount for immediate payment such as
the item on February 9 when Best & Company gave $1 discount
on $50 worth of merchandise because the funds were trans-
ferred immediately. Yet another nuance of finance in the
checkless society took place on February 11 when Mr. Doe on
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a "hot" tip paid $325 to the brokerage house of Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. The tip, whether it was
good or not, resulted in an overdraft of $291.17 on his
account.
Because of the automatic line of credit that will
become concurrent with checkless society, the bank's com-
puter just borrowed the necessary sum and Merrill Lynch was
none the wiser.
If the consensus of experts is right, the checkless
society will be a cheaper, faster and more efficient way in
which to handle money matters.
A. R. Zipf, executive vice president of the Bank of
America, in answering his own question, "You want to know
what is the next step in the automation of money?" states
the requirement necessary to make electro-banking a reality,
and gave his solution for Mr. Trabbold's "biggest problem









The problems which the military family faces with
regard to financial affairs are caused primarily by the
requirement of moving and establishing its financial status
at each new location. In Chapter II many of these problems
were outlined, and to the person who is faced with the
problems they appear even more monumental than can be
described in any paper. The military departments have made
a provision to aid in the transfer of funds. This is a mail
version of what the bank of the future envisions, i.e. the
military man can have his salary sent directly to the bank
for later disposition. In fact, as Chapter III describes,
in individual parts and combinations of mail and computers,
all the features of electro-banking are now available. The
questions, can this be of use to the military family, and
how, are the points of this thesis.
Military Banking Program an Aid
The term Military Banking Program as used in this
paper refers to a procedure utilizing military pay in con-




best service possible for military personnel wherever they
are in the world. Such a program can very definitely be an
aid. Civilian banks already have available the services to
provide ready and acceptable cash, check, and credit trans-
actions. An integrated service such as that of the Bankers
Trust of New York which provides guaranteed checks with an
automatic line-of-credit , together with the compatible
credit card program as being operated by the Midwest Bank
Card System, could be the simple solution to the financial
problems of military families. The use of a service or
social security number as the account number would make it
easy for the military family to remember. Insurance is also
available to lessen the problems of lost cards. With an
account number the same as the social security or service
number, lost card information could be quickly called into
the bank as soon as the loss was discovered.
Implementation and operation of such a program would
require the support of top military and civilian personnel
at the service level and in the Office of the Secretary of
Defense. It would require that the "complete package" of
services be available from the participating banks. There
would need to be an interchange of paper between merchant
banks and cardholder banks which would cover the entire
United States. The interchange would not be unlike the
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method now used for clearing checks through the Federal
Reserve System. Publicity would be an aspect of such a pro-
gram that cannot be overlooked. The military families would
need to know that the program was available and what ser-
vices it could provide. It would be essential that mer-
chants be aware of the program and hopefully most would
participate in the system, especially in and near towns with
large military family populations.
Bank Services Available
The use of an allotment to transfer the pay of a
military person to a bank account each month constitutes not
only a service to the military family involved, but is an
asset to the bank. The bank has the use of this money until
a check written on the account clears or until a credit card
charge appears 'against it. The bank can depend on receiving
the deposit on the first of each month; in one case, the
amount a financial institution receives in military allot-
ments each month is in excess of $2.6 million.
The services that could be made available by a bank
in exchange for the allotment business from a service family
should include the three mentioned earlier: a checking
account (including the guarantee card) , a compatible credit
card (no charge if paid within thirty days, or deducted
from the account each month) , and line-of-credit (a service
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charge or interest rate based on either a daily overdraft
position or amount outstanding at the end of the month)
.
These three basic services would allow the military family
to establish their "credit standing" at one bank, and to
continue to do all their basic banking there (by mail) while
using its services all over the world. Thus, there would
be no need to draw special pay while in transit. With
military pay allotted to the same bank each month regardless
of where the service member is located, his family could
either use the credit card or cash a check for its needs.
If the family needed a "small loan" they would simply
utilize the line-of-credit. The amount of the line of credit
available to them would be established by the bank based on
lengthv' of service, basic pay, size of the allotment, and
history of the account.
With these services available, the military wife
would not have to wait for the allotment check to arrive
before doing her weekend shopping, and the family could plan
their money flow during a period of transfer and at Christ-
mas time. There would be no need for. the family to request
a loan each time a small amount was needed; they could use




Services for both Military and Civilian
Total banking with the services as suggested above
is compatible with civilian needs. Provision of a single
card for all the banking services discussed is a natural
extension of the various systems of cards now being used.
For civilians a deposit could be made either by paycheck
or cash; many companies now directly deposit in the bank
the entire payroll for the company. The Navy has over
728,000 personnel who are potential customers for a total
banking program. There are presently over 3.5 million
active duty personnel in the military services who would
provide an excellent base on which to begin a total banking
service with military pay. The military services as a group
could be the starting point for such a program but addi-
tional customers would come from the civilian population.
If the program were used by both, the larger number of
accounts would make it more attractive to merchants and
thereby provide greater services to those participating in
the program.
Organization
Members of two organizations have shown a deep and
continuing interest in the developments being made toward
the "checkless society," more recently referred to as
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electro-banking. George W. Mitchell and Andrew F. Brimmer,
both Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and Dale L.
Reistad, Director of Automation, The American Bankers
Association, have repeatedly expressed the opinion that a
program such as described in this paper is the stepping
stone toward the "checkless society" and electro-banking.
Since the Federal Reserve System and the American Bankers
Association have conducted studies, published papers and
held conferences on all aspects of the banking services
advocated by the research findings in this paper, they would
be the most logical places to begin the program of Total
Banking with Military Pay . It would also be necessary for
the Department of Defense to actively participate in efforts
to bring about a program using military pay procedures as
its basic input. Responsibility for the implementation of
this type program would be interfaced at the military
department level and the bank concerned. A precedent for
this type of joint effort to provide a needed service to
military personnel was established in 1965. At that time,
the Department of Defense, in conjunction with a concordant
of civilian life insurance companies, started to provide
military personnel with an automatic life insurance coverage
of $10,000, at the rate of $2 per month, probably one of
Servicemen's Group Life Insurance, provisions of
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the best programs available anywhere.
Ultimately, the organization of and responsibility
for the program of Total Banking with Military Pay must
rest with the three principals named above: the Department
of Defense (the input and recipient of the services) , the
Federal Reserve Board (the regulator of banking services)
,
and the banks themselves hopefully represented by the Ameri-
can Bankers Association (the provider of the services)
.
Close cooperation among these three organizations would
help facilitate the establishment of a successful program.
Conclusion
The conclusion of this paper is that it is now
feasible to establish a program of Total Banking with Mili -
tary Pay . The research conducted here reveals that all of
the money services of electro-banking are now either avail-
able or in the planning/testing stage. Although many bankers
can see only to the boundaries of their ov/n towns, some
already realize the importance of offering a full line of
services to military personnel, and indeed, there are
bankers who see the day when electro-banking eventually will
be available to everyone. There is now a need to bring
subchapter III of chapter 19, title 38, United States Code
(P.L. 89-214) announced to the Navy by Secretary of the
Navy Instruction 7220 of 8 October" 1965 (ALNAV 68).
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these services together into a coordinated and integrated
program. The procedures of making deposits by allotment of
military pay and the use of checks, compatible credit cards
and automatic line-of-credit would utilize the postal and
delivery services in effect at the present time. Paper
movement in this program will be reduced when the on-line
transfers and use of computers finally bring into being the
"checkless" or "less cash" society—more properly called
electro-banking. An important consideration which comes to
light in this paper is that such a comprehensive military
banking program could provide a solution to many of the
money handling problems of military families. By relieving
the military wife of money flow pressures this type of pro-
gram would enhance their morale and the resultant morale of
the service member.
Recommendation
The research conducted in writing this paper leads
to a strong recommendation, that those services now avail-
able in the banking industry should be used to aid the
military family with its money flow problems. This type of
action, first of all, will require the support of the Office
of the Secretary of Defense. Also, the Federal Reserve
Board may have to assist in the full implementation of such
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a program, which could be nation-wide in scope, since some
banks may need to be persuaded to offer these services to
military personnel.
The recommendation of this paper to both the banks
and the military departments can be taken from a quotation
of A. R. Zipf, executive vice president of the Bank of
America: "It's getting out and selling these new services."
If the banks do succeed in selling total banking services to
the military the results will be of great mutual benefit.
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